We evaluate the hypothesis that the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint was, in practice, irrelevant during the recent ZLB episode experienced by the U.S. economy (2009Q1-2015Q4). We focus on two dimensions of economic performance that were ex-ante likely to have been affected by a binding ZLB: (i) the volatility of macro variables and (ii) the economy's response to shocks. Using a variety of empirical methods, we find little evidence against the irrelevance hypothesis, with our estimates suggesting that the responses of output, inflation and the long-term interest rate were hardly affected by the binding ZLB constraint. We show how a shadow interest rate rule (which we take as a proxy for forward guidance) can reconcile our empirical findings with the predictions of a simple New Keynesian model with a ZLB constraint.
Introduction
The magnitude of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the recession that it triggered, led many central banks to lower their policy rates down to values near zero, their theoretical lower bound. 1 In the U.S., the target for the Federal Funds Rate remained at zero for seven years, from January 2009 through December 2015. During that period the short-term interest rate stopped playing its role as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization. Was the performance of the U.S. economy affected by the binding zero lower bound (ZLB)? The present paper seeks to provide an answer to that question. More specifically, our goal is to evaluate the merits of what we refer to as the ZLB empirical irrelevance hypothesis (or the "irrelevance hypothesis," for short), i.e. the hypothesis that the economy's performance was not affected by the binding ZLB constraint, in practice, during the recent U.S. episode. In particular, we focus on two dimensions of that performance that were ex-ante likely to have experienced the impact of a binding ZLB: (i) the volatility of macro variables and (ii) the economy's response to shocks.
We start our empirical exploration with an assessment of the possible changes in the volatility of macro variables during the period in which the ZLB constraint was binding.
A rise in volatility could have been expected as a result of the Fed's hands being tied due to the Federal Funds Rate having hit the ZLB, since this prevented the "usual" stabilizing policy response to aggregate shocks. Yet, we find little evidence of such an increase in volatility of either real or nominal U.S. macro variables over the period during which the Federal Funds Rate attained its zero lower bound. The previous finding is at odds with the predictions of a baseline New Keynesian model, as we show by means of a number of simulations, under the assumption that the central bank follows a simple 1 Several central banks lowered their policy rates down to values below zero, thus proving that the latter should be seen a soft lower bound. From the point of view of our paper what matters is the existence of a "perceived" value below which a given central bank is not willing to lower the policy rate, i.e. an effective lower bound. In the case of the U.S. economy, which is the focus of the present paper, zero appears to be the Fed's effective lower bound.
interest rate rule that embeds the ZLB assumption.
In the second part of the paper we ask ourselves whether the response of a variety of U.S. macro variables (other than the policy rate itself) to different aggregate shocks changed during the binding ZLB episode. Our empirical approach involves the estimation of a structural vector autoregressive model with time-varying coefficients (TVC-SVAR), driven by four shocks that are identified by means of a combination of long run and sign restrictions. Under the "irrelevance hypothesis" there should not be any significant change in the estimated responses over the binding ZLB period, relative to period before the ZLB was binding. This is indeed what we find. In particular, we show that the estimated response of the long-term interest rate during the ZLB period is very similar to its counterpart for the pre-ZLB period. Furthermore, when we estimate a "rule" for the long-term rate we find little evidence of a break during the ZLB period.
The previous findings are consistent with (but not a proof of) the notion that the adoption and fine-tuning of unconventional monetary policies (UMPs, henceforth) may have been highly effective during the ZLB period in steering the long rate as desired, despite an unchanged policy rate. To illustrate that interpretation we show how the previous findings can be reconciled with the predictions of a baseline New Keynesian model when we assume an interest rate rule based on a shadow interest rate. That rule can be interpreted as capturing the role of forward guidance (i.e. the management of expectations on the future path of the policy rate) in getting around the constraints imposed by the ZLB.
We want to warn the reader at the outset against two possible misinterpretations of our findings. Firstly, one may be tempted to view those findings as suggesting that, contrary to what mainstream economic theory implies in the presence of nominal rigidities, the ZLB is irrelevant "always and everywhere." Instead, our evidence focuses on a specific economy (the U.S.) and episode (the 2009Q1-2015Q4 period). Several uncon-ventional programs were adopted by the Federal Reserve during that period, which may account for our evidence. A binding ZLB could very well have a different impact in a different context if unaccompanied by such unconventional policies. Secondly, our "irrelevance" findings should not be interpreted as downplaying the significance of the Great Recession and the slowness of the subsequent recovery. Together with the associated deflationary pressures, they were undoubtedly the main factors behind the sharp reduction in the Federal Funds Rate down to its zero lower bound. Our findings suggest, however, that no special role should be attributed to the ZLB constraint as explanation for the depth and persistence of the recession. Instead, the size, persistence and financial nature of the shocks experienced by the U.S. economy (before the start of the ZLB episode) are more likely explanations of the severity of the downturn, as had been the case for many other financial crises experienced by different countries in the past, and which did not generally involve a binding ZLB constraint. 2 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 provides evidence on the impact of the binding ZLB on macroeconomic volatility. Section 4 contrasts that evidence with the predictions of a baseline New Keynesian model. Section 5 studies how the binding ZLB constraint may have affected the economy's response to a variety of shocks. Section 6 analyzes the ability of a modified interest rate rule to account for the empirical evidence. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Related Literature
Our work is close in spirit to papers that seek to evaluate, using different approaches, some form of ZLB irrelevance hypothesis. Thus, Swanson and Williams (2014) es-2 Many empirical papers have provided evidence on the unusual depth and persistence of downturns caused by financial crises. See e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Cerra and Saxena (2008) , and IMF (2009). Romer and Romer (2018) provide evidence suggesting that the degree of monetary and fiscal policy space greatly affects the macroeconomic performance in the aftermath of financial crises. timate the time-varying sensitivity of yields to macroeconomic announcements using high-frequency data, and conclude that long-term yields were essentially unconstrained throughout 2008 to 2012, and short-term yields seemed to be constrained only by late 2011. Similarly, Campbell et al. (2012) provide evidence suggesting that forward guidance announcements by the FOMC have been successful in moving interest rates that are relevant for household's' and firms' decisions, despite the binding ZLB constraint.
The recent work of Wu and Xia (2016) and Wu and Zhang (2017) is also closely related to our paper. Thus, Wu and Xia (2016) propose a shadow rate indicator as a measure of the monetary policy stance that also applies to binding ZLB periods. They embed their shadow rate in an identified FAVAR model similar to that in Bernanke et al. (2005) , and find that (exogenous) changes in the shadow rate have an impact on the economy during the ZLB period similar to the Federal Funds rate in the pre-ZLB period. A counterfactual simulation, in which the shadow rate is prevented from becoming negative, points to large real effects of having a persistently negative shadow rate during the ZLB period, which they attribute to the adoption of unconventional monetary policies. Wu and Zhang (2017) study a New Keynesian model where aggregate demand is a function of a shadow rate which is not subject to a ZLB constraint and which is determined according to a conventional Taylor-type rule. The equilibrium dynamics are thus equivalent to those of the standard New Keynesian model without a ZLB constraint. Wu and Zhang discuss alternative channels through which the central bank can lower the shadow rate below zero, including purchases of assets by the central bank (combined with a preferred habitat-like assumption), direct lending to firms and/or changes in tax rates on interest income. They conclude that a binding ZLB constraint on the policy rate does not have to alter the responses of aggregate variables to supply and demand shocks relative to periods with a non-binding ZLB, as long as the central bank manages to adjust the shadow rate suitably. Christiano et al. (2015) estimate and analyze a DSGE model that incorporates a truncated shadow rule similar to the one considered below. They use the estimated model to interpret the Great Recession. They attribute the bulk of the fall in output to a drop in TFP and a rise in the cost of working capital, with counterfactual simulations without a ZLB constraint suggesting that the latter played a small role in accounting for the drop in output. That finding contrasts with Gust et al. (2017) who carry out a similar counterfactual experiment and find that a 30 percent of the output contraction observed during the Great Recession can be attributed to the constraint imposed by the ZLB on the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy, with that constraint playing an even larger role in accounting for the slow recovery. Those estimates are, however, subject to large uncertainty. 3 A similar finding obtains in Del Negro et al. (2017) , whose counterfactual simulations of a DSGE model with financial frictions suggest that the ZLB constraint can explain about one-half of the 6 percent decline in output that would have been observed in the absence of unconventional interventions.
Our findings above point to the benefits of adopting a shadow rule with sufficient inertia, which we interpret as a shortcut for UMPs. A number of papers have also uncovered a similar result using alternative models and assumptions, including Reifschneider and Roberts (2006) , Kiley and Roberts (2017) , and Bernanke et al. (2019) . Cochrane (2018) notes the absence of break in the dynamics of U.S. inflation and, in particular, the absence of a rise in inflation volatility during the binding ZLB episode. He argues that such an observation is inconsistent with the New Keynesian model, unless the fiscal theory of the price level is invoked. Our analysis in section 6 provides an alternative explanation for that observation, based on the use of forward guidance as a stabilizing tool.
Other authors have uncovered a change in asset price dynamics associated with the binding ZLB episode. Thus, Gourio and Ngo (2018) document a switch in the sign of the correlation between inflation and stock returns after 2008, which they attribute to the binding ZLB. Using a standard New Keynesian model, they show how the binding ZLB amplifies (dampens) the impact of demand (supply) shocks, lowering both inflation and term premia in long term interest rates, which may partly account for the latter's unusually low levels since 2008. Similarly, Datta et al. (2019) document a substantial rise in the correlation between oil and equity returns, as well as a large responsiveness of those variables to news announcements, during the binding ZLB episode, and show that finding can be reconciled with a New Keynesian model embedding the ZLB constraint.
Our paper, and the literature described above, can be seen as complementing the extensive work aimed at assessing the effects of UMPs and, in particular, the effects of UMP announcements or their implementation on financial variables. Examples of that work include D'Amico and King (2013, 2017) Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Hamilton and Wu (2012) and Swanson (2017) , among many others.
Throughout the paper we maintain the assumption of an unchanged inflation target, which we take as exogenously given. A branch of the literature has instead focused on the determination of the optimal inflation rate in the presence of the ZLB constraint, given the trade-off between the distortions associated with a higher average inflation and the benefits from it in the form of a smaller incidence of a binding ZLB. Contributions to that branch of the literature include Coibion et al. (2012) , Dordal-i-Carreras et al.
(2016), Blanco (2016) , Kiley and Roberts (2017) and Andrade et al. (2019) .
Macroeconomic Volatility and the Zero Lower Bound: Some Evidence
We start with an empirical assessment of the impact of the binding ZLB constraint on U.S. macroeconomic volatility. We report statistics for GDP and total hours in the nonfarm business sector (both in log first differences), as well as three measures of quarterly inflation based, respectively, on the GDP deflator, the core CPI and the core PCE deflator. All data are quarterly. The first column of Table 1 reports The previous statistics show little evidence of an increase in macro volatility during the ZLB period. Many of the ratios of standard deviations are below one, suggesting if anything a decline in volatility during the ZLB period. The previous statistics contrast starkly with the volatility in the pre-1984 period relative to the same benchmark, shown in the last column. In the latter case the ratio of standard deviations is well above one for all the variables considered. 4 Table 2 provides additional evidence pertaining to potential changes in volatility during the ZLB episode. It reports the estimates from an OLS regression of the absolute value of the deviation of each variable (i.e. GDP growth, hours growth and each of the three inflation measures) from a (period-specific) mean, on a constant and a dummy variable for the ZLB episode. 5 Together with each point estimate, we report the corresponding standard errors, computed using the Newey-West estimator with a 4-lag window. As a robustness check we also report estimates from regressions that include a dummy for the Great Recession in addition to the ZLB period. The eventual impact of the binding ZLB on the volatility of each variable should be captured by the estimated coefficient of the ZLB dummy in the corresponding regression. As the estimates reported in Table 2 indicate, there is no evidence of a significant volatility increase during the ZLB period in any of the variables considered, for any specification. By contrast, we find two instances of a significant reduction in volatility during that episode: this is the case for core CPI and core PCE inflation.
The evidence reported in Tables 1 and 2 (2019), among many others. In contrast with those papers our focus here is on the implications of the binding ZLB constraint for macro volatility, relative to "normal" times.
Our model is fully standard so we restrict ourselves to describing its main elements.
We assume an infinitely-lived representative household with expected utility given by
where C t is a CES function (with elasticity of substitution > 1) of the quantities consumed of a continuum of differentiated goods and N t denotes hours worked. The discount factor β 0,t is defined recursively by β 0,t = β 0,t−1 exp{−z t }, for t = 1, 2, 3, ...with β 0,0 ≡ 1. Variable z t is the implied discount rate, which is assumed to follow a stochastic process with two components:
The first component, {ρ t }, is a two-state Markov process, switching between a "normal" value ρ > 0 and a low value ρ L < 0. The realization of the latter, which we interpret as a large adverse demand shock, pulls the short-term interest rate against the ZLB constraint, given the assumed policy rule. The second component, {η t }, is meant to capture "regular" or "recurrent" demand shocks, and is assumed to follow an AR(1)
where ρ η ∈ [0, 1), and {ε η t } is a white noise process with variance σ 2 η . For concreteness, in the simulations below we restrict ourselves to shifts in the discount rate {z t } as a source of aggregate fluctuations.
The supply side is fully standard. We assume a continuum of identical monopolistically competitive firms, each facing a constant Calvo probability θ of not being able to re-optimize its price on any given period. Technology is given by
All output is consumed. The labor market is perfectly competitive.
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions describing the private sector of this economy are given by the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve and dynamic IS equations:
where π t ≡ π t − π and y t ≡ y t − y respectively denote the deviation of inflation and (log) output from their steady state values, i t is the short-term (one-period) nominal interest
. 6 It can be easily checked that under our assumptions the natural (flexible price) level of output is constant (and corresponds to the steady state), while z t has the interpretation of the natural (flexible price) rate of interest.
The model is closed by assuming a monetary policy rule. As an empirically plausible baseline we consider the following "truncated" version of a Taylor-type rule with inertia:
(1)
Below we also analyze the equilibrium behavior of a long-term interest rate, which we define as the yield on a pure discount bond with stochastic maturity. More precisely, the long-term bond is assumed to mature each period with probability 1 − γ, in which case it pays one unit of the numéraire (while yielding no payoff otherwise). The (normalized) yield of that bond, denoted by i L t , can be shown to satisfy the following difference equation in equilibrium (and up to a first order approximation):
We adopt a quarterly calibration of the model. We assume θ = 0.75, which implies an average price duration of four quarters. The coefficients of the policy rule are set to φ π = 1.5, φ y = 0.5, and φ i = 0.7, in line with the empirical evidence. Steady state inflation π is set to 0.005, consistent with an (annual) inflation target of 2 percent.
We assume α = 0.25 and ϕ = 1, both conventional values. We set = 6 implying a flexible price markup of 20 percent. We assume ρ η = 0.8 and σ η = 0.001. Under the previous settings, the standard deviation of quarterly output growth when the ZLB is not binding is about 0.7 percent, consistent with that of U.S. GDP growth over the 1984Q1-2008Q4 period. We set ρ = 0.005, implying an average real rate of 2 percent in "normal" times. We assume ρ L = −0.01, so that a large adverse demand shock implies a natural rate of minus 4 percent in annual terms (and in the absence of other Similarly to Fernández-Villaverde et. al. (2015), we solve the model using a global projection method to accurately account for the uncertainty and the nonlinearities associated with the presence of the occasionally binding ZLB constraint. In particular, we approximate the policy functions for inflation, output, and interest rates with Chebyshev polynomials (or splines) through a collocation method on a discrete grid for the four state variables (lagged output and interest rate, and the two components of the demand shocks). Figure 2 shows the dynamic responses of several macro variables to a negative η t shock, under the two possible states of the economy, namely, "normal" times (i.e. when the ZLB is non-binding, shown in blue circled lines) and under a binding ZLB regime (shown in red lines with diamonds). The figure illustrates clearly the destabilizing role of a binding ZLB in the face of an adverse demand shock, relative to "normal" times: the inability to bring down the policy rate leads to a much larger decline of output and inflation. Note that the long-term rate responds in opposite directions to the negative demand shock under the two scenarios. It declines in normal times, reflecting the expectations of a persistently lower short-term rate. On the other hand, when the negative demand shock hits the economy during a binding ZLB episode, the long rate increases, reflecting the expectations of a (transitorily) higher path of short-term rates in the future, when the ZLB stops being binding, since in that case the economy would experience higher output growth in its transition to the new steady state, having started from a lower output level due to the current adverse demand shock. Note also that the contractionary effect of higher expected nominal short-term rates (reflected in the higher long-term nominal rate) is further amplified by the deflationary expectations caused by the shock, leading to an even larger increase in the long-term real rate (not shown). Tables 3 and 4, discussed below, formalize that visual intuition. Figure 2 and the evidence in Figure 3 , the binding ZLB episode is characterized by a much larger average volatility, especially when we exclude the Markov transition observations from the computation of the standard deviation (right column). Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients, using simulated data, from a regression of the absolute value of (demeaned) output growth and inflation on a ZLB dummy, with and without a control dummy for the two periods when a Markov transition occurs. 7
The regression uses time series generated by 1000 simulations of the calibrated model.
Each time series has 138 observations, with a binding ZLB episode taking place between periods 101 and 128, i.e. a pattern that corresponds to that observed in the empirical sample period used in the previous section. In addition to the mean estimated coefficients, we report the 95% confidence band across simulations (shown in brackets), as well as the fraction of simulations for which we reject the null of a zero coefficient on the ZLB dummy at the 5 percent significance level, using the Newey-West estimate of standard errors. Note that the mean (as well as the 95 percent confidence band) of the estimated coefficients on the ZLB dummy are systematically positive, reflecting the increase in volatility associated with ZLB episodes. This is true for both output growth and inflation, and independently of whether we control for the periods with "large shocks,"
corresponding to the Markov transitions. The previous finding contrasts with the estimates of the corresponding regressions using U.S. data and reported in Table 2 , and where most of the estimated coefficients on the ZLB dummy were insignificant, with the exception of a few instances in which they were significantly negative (thus pointing to a reduction in volatility). Finally, note that the large fraction of simulations (ranging between 86 and 98 percent, depending on the variable and specification) for which the null of no change in volatility during the ZLB episode is rejected at the 5 percent sig-7 As in Table 3 we allow for a period-specific mean during the binding ZLB episode.
nificance level. The previous finding suggests that the relatively short ZLB period is not an obstacle for the changing volatility test to have a high power, when the data are generated by our baseline calibrated model.
Did the Binding ZLB Affect the Economy's Response to Shocks?
In the present section we use a structural vector autoregressive model with time-varying coefficients (TVC-SVAR), to estimate the dynamic responses of a number of macro variables to several identified aggregate shocks. The main motivation for using a model with time-varying coefficients lies in our interest in assessing the extent to which the binding ZLB episode implied a change in the way the economy responded to different shocks. In addition, the use of a TVC-SVAR provides a flexible specification which allows for other structural changes that the U.S. economy may have experienced over the sample period used in the estimation. 8
Our Empirical Approach
Let x t = [∆(y t − n t ), n t , π t , i L t ] where y t is (log) output in the nonfarm business sector, n t denotes (log) hours of all persons in the nonfarm business sector, π t is GDP deflator inflation and i L t is the 10-year Treasury bond yield. Both output and hours are normalized by civilian population. All data are for the U.S. economy, at a quarterly frequency, and cover the period 1953Q2 through 2015Q4. 9 We assume that the evolution of x t is described by the following TVC-VAR model
where A 0,t is a vector of time-varying intercepts, A i,t , for i = 1, ..., p are matrices of time-varying coefficients, and u t is a Gaussian white noise vector process with covariance matrix Σ t . We assume the reduced form innovations u t are a linear transformation of the underlying structural shocks ε t given by
where E{ε t ε t } = I and E{ε t ε t−k } = 0 for all t and k = 1, 2, 3, .... It follows that
Following Primiceri (2005) , we assume that the coefficients of the autoregressive matrices {A i,t } and the covariance matrix Σ t follow random walks, as described in detail in the Appendix. The resulting reduced form model is estimated as in Del Negro and Primiceri (2013) . Given the estimated reduced form VAR for any given period t we recover the reduced form M A representation
where µ t is a vector of time-varying means and B t (L) is a polynomial of (time-varying) matrices.
The identifying restrictions assumed below allow us to determine the linear mapping Q t . Given the latter, we can write the structural M A representation as
where C t (L) ≡ B t (L)Q t describes the dynamic responses of the economy in period t.
The possible changes over time in those responses are the focus of our analysis. Next we turn to the determination of Q t , i.e. to the issue of identification.
Identification
We assume fluctuations in x t are driven by four structural shocks, represented by the elements of vector ε t : technology, demand, monetary policy and temporary supply shocks.
We use a mix of long run and sign restrictions in order to identify those shocks, as follows:
(i) the technology shock is the only one with a permanent effect on labor productivity;
(ii) a demand shock generates a positive comovement of prices, GDP and the long-term interest rate; (iii) a monetary policy shock generates a positive comovement between prices and GDP, but a negative one between the previous variables and the long-term interest rate; (iv) a transitory supply shock (e.g. a markup shock) implies a negative comovement of inflation and GDP. All the restrictions on the sign of comovements refer to a one-year horizon. The long run restriction used to identify technology was first proposed in Galí (1999) . The sign restrictions are consistent with the predictions of a standard New Keynesian model under a plausible policy rule, and are generally satisfied by estimated DSGE models (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007) ). In the Appendix we discuss how the previous identification strategy is implemented in practice. with diamonds). Note that both subsamples contain 28 periods. We also display 68 and 95 percent confidence bands for the average impulse responses in the pre-ZLB period, based on 500 draws from the posterior distribution of the estimated model. 10
Evidence
The differences in the estimated responses between the two periods are very small, for all variables and shocks considered. In particular, the estimated responses of output and inflation for the two periods lie almost on top of each other. Most importantly, note that the lack of a significant gap between the responses in the two periods carries over to both the nominal and real long-term yields, which are arguably more relevant in the determination of aggregate demand than the short term nominal rate (which does not adjust during the binding ZLB period). While the response of both the nominal and real long-term rate over the ZLB period appears slightly muted relative to the pre-ZLB period, the difference is quantitatively very small and statistically insignificant. Figure 4b displays the corresponding impulse response differentials with their associated confidence bands. One cannot reject the null of a zero differential response for any variable, even at a 32 percent significance level.
The finding of similar responses of the long term rate across the two subsample periods is consistent with our "irrelevance hypothesis." Though we do not offer any direct evidence in that regard, that finding suggests that -possibly through the use of unconventional policies like forward guidance and quantitative easing-the Fed managed to steer long-term rates "as in normal times," in response to shocks hitting the economy during the ZLB period, thus leading to similar responses of output and inflation.
A caveat that might be raised regarding the evidence reported in Figures 4a and 4b is that the estimated impulse responses may be somehow distorted by the Great Recession, which overlaps with both the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods. Figure 4c reports estimates of average impulse responses for the pre-ZLB and ZLB periods, but excluding from the respective averages the estimated responses for the Great Recession quarters (i.e. those between 2008Q1 and 2009Q2). None of the qualitative findings discussed above seem to be affected by the exclusion of that episode.
An additional potential caveat is that the methodology used may not be able to capture changes in dynamics that take place suddenly, as opposed to gradually over time.
Figure 4d seeks to dispel that concern by comparing the average impulse responses over the ZLB period with the median estimated average response across 500 draws, with each draw corresponding to a sample period of consecutive 28 observations, drawn randomly from the set {1984Q1:1990Q4,..., 2002Q1:2008Q4}. 11 The resulting estimates are once again very similar across the two periods, suggesting a relatively uniform response over the entire post-1984 period.
We conclude this section by providing an alternative perspective on the "irrelevance hypothesis" and the possible role played by the long-term interest rate in getting around the ZBL constraint. Consider the following (admittedly ad-hoc) descriptive "rule" for the long-term interest rate,
implying that the estimated rule satisfies the so-called Taylor principle. Most interesting, however, is the insignificance of the estimated coefficient on the multiplicative dummies associated with the binding ZLB period, suggesting the absence of a discernable change in the systematic response of the long-term interest rate to inflation and output growth as a consequence of the ZLB constraint becoming binding.
Reconciling Theory and Evidence
The above empirical findings lend support, overall, to the irrelevance hypothesis. One possible explanation for our findings is that the implementation of unconventional monetary policies during the binding ZLB episode made it possible to steer the long-term interest rate "as in normal times" in response to developments in the economy. The absence of unconventional policies in the baseline New Keynesian model analyzed in section 3 may thus account for the discrepancy between our evidence and the model predictions.
In the present section we study whether modifying the specification of monetary policy in our baseline model can help reconcile theory and evidence. In particular, and following Christiano et al. (2015) , Gust et al. (2017) and Andrade et al. (2018) , among others, we replace the baseline interest rate rule (1) with the following shadow rate rule:
where i s t is a shadow interest rate which is not subject to any lower bound and which evolves according to By contrast, the central bank manages to bring down the long-term nominal rate in response to the adverse demand shock, albeit not as much as under the non-binding ZLB regime, and despite the lack of an adjustment in the short-term rule. The channel through which the shadow rate rule (6) manages to stabilize the economy is one typically associated with forward guidance policies: the inertial term in (6), which is not bounded below, implies that the short-term rate will be kept "lower for longer" relative to the baseline rule (1) in the aftermath of a binding ZLB episode, with the expected length of that additional stimulus being commensurate to the size of the decline in inflation and output, as well as the size of the inertial coefficient φ i .
Tables 6 and 7, based on simulations of the calibrated New Keynesian model with the shadow rate rule in place, report evidence on the implied changes in volatility during the binding ZLB period, in a way analogous to Tables 3 and 4 for the baseline rule. Note that the estimates of the standard deviation of output growth and inflation in the binding ZLB period relative to the nonbinding ZLB period, shown in Table 6 , are noticeably lower than those in Table 3 , reflecting the gains in stability from the adoption of the shadow rate rule. Furthermore, the reported relative standard deviations are comparable to some of the estimates in Table 1 , obtained using actual U.S. data. Similarly, the estimated volatility regressions reported in Table 7 show very limited evidence of an increase in volatility during the binding ZLB episodes, with the implied fraction of simulations for which the null of no change in volatility is rejected at the 5 percent significance level being very small for most specifications (with a largest value of 49 percent). The previous findings are visually captured by Figure 6 , which displays the time series for output growth and inflation around the time of a large adverse demand shock, based on a simulation of our calibrated model under the shadow rate rule. In contrast to Figure   3 , which was based on simulations under the baseline rule, neither the volatility of the simulated series nor the width of the "tunnel" appear to change in a discernible way during the binding ZLB episode (the period between the two vertical lines).
Concluding Comments
The ZLB empirical irrelevance hypothesis implies that the an economy's performance is not affected, in practice, by a binding ZLB episode. The objective of the present paper was to evaluate that hypothesis for the recent ZLB episode experienced by the U.S. economy (2009Q1-2015Q4). We have focused on two dimensions of performance that were ex-ante likely to have experienced the impact of a binding ZLB: (i) the volatility of macro variables and (ii) the economy's response to a variety of macro shocks. Using several empirical approaches, we find little evidence against the irrelevance hypothesis, with our estimates suggesting that macro volatility did not increase significantly as a result of the binding ZLB constraint. Similarly, the responses of output, inflation and the long-term interest rate to different shocks do not appear to have been much affected by that constraint. Our empirical findings can be reconciled with the predictions of a simple New Keynesian model under the assumption of a shadow interest rate rule, which can be viewed as capturing the effects of forward guidance policies that commit to "lower for longer" interest rates.
We interpret our findings as being consistent with (though not a proof of) the hypothesis that the unconventional monetary policies implemented during the ZLB years may have succeeded, at least to some extent, at getting around the constraints imposed by the ZLB on conventional monetary policy.
Under that hypothesis, the unusual magnitude of Great Recession and the slowness of the subsequent recovery in the U.S. economy would be just the consequence of the large size, high persistence, and financial nature of the shock that triggered that recession, with no special amplifying role attributed to the binding ZLB constraint.
One should not interpret our evidence as suggesting that the ZLB constraint is irrelevant "always and everywhere." A binding ZLB could very well have a much larger impact in a context different from the one that has been the object of analysis here. tation of the model is given by
where B t,j = [Ã j t ] n,n , for j = 1, 2, .., where [M ] n,n represents the first n rows and n columns of any matrix M , and where B t,0 = I.
The identification is implemented as follows. Let
where 0 is n-dimensional column vector of zeros, H n t and H n−1 t are orthogonal matrices of dimension n × n and n − 1 × n − 1 respectively. To impose the restrictions we use the standard algorithm, see Uhlig (2005) and Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2010).
We draw H n−1 t using the QR decomposition and compute the implied structural impulse response functions as in (3) 
where S t is the Cholesky factor of B t (1)Σ t B t (1). We retain the draw if the sign restrictions are satisfied. We collect a total of 500 draws at each point in time. With no loss of generality we order the shocks as follows: technology, demand, monetary policy and supply.
Sign restrictions for set identificaton require only qualitative implications from the theory. This can be seen as an advantage with respect to standard methods since exclusion contemporaneous restrictions are often arbitrary or hard to justify. The sign restriction approach, however, presents also a few drawbacks. As Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) show, the previous approach implies informative priors for the structural parameters and this might have implications for the analysis and the interpretation of the results. See also Watson's discussion of our paper in the present volume.
The average IRFs over the full pre-ZLB period are computed as follows.
1. Draw an integer between 1 and 78 with equal probabilitites over the set of possible starting periods. Call it t 0 (j). %REJ is the fraction of simulations for which the estimated coefficient on the ZLB dummy is positive and statistically significant using the Newey-West estimate of the standard error (4 lags). %REJ is the fraction of simulations for which the estimated coefficient on the ZLB dummy is positive and statistically significant using the Newey-West estimate of the standard error (4 lags).
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